Compatibility and support
Packagers and teams that keep packslip at a fixed version can find what an
unchanged binary keeps doing, what forces an update, and what each release
is tested against. Publishers can find what to check before recommending
packslip install. To install packslip, see Install
packslip.
What an unchanged binary keeps doing
An older packslip can stay your bootstrapper while the tools it installs move on. Ordinary tool updates need no matching packslip release, because the version 1 format contract keeps release metadata stable. A new major version of the CLI, library, or action leaves the format at version 1. Maintaining packaged verifiers lists what can force an update.
Supported platforms
packslip install runs on Linux x64 and ARM64, macOS ARM64, and Windows
x64 and ARM64. Elsewhere, Intel macOS included, it fails with
unsupported bootstrap host <os>/<arch>, such as darwin/x86_64.
verify and pin have no host check, so a source build that compiles
there can run them. Check for a release
build lists the release builds.
Every release must pass the install tests natively on those five platforms. It must also build and install the Debian and RPM packages from the offline source archive on Linux x64 and ARM64; see Package packslip for a distribution.
Version requirements
First packslip release with each feature:
- 1.5.0:
packslip installand its trust-root refresh,packslip pin,--pinwith aps1_signer fingerprint, theinstall-cliandverify-clibuilds, and the agent skill declared in packslip's own releases. - 1.5.1:
packslip installunder a group-writable umask, such as Debian's002. - 1.9.1: the Go module through the Go module proxy.
Releases up to 1.10.1 differ from later ones:
- They refuse an empty release list, as do mise releases built on those packslip versions; see Manage release lists.
- Without trust flags,
verifyandpinrefuse a release signed through another repository's reusable workflow. verifyhas no--allow-other-repository.- Identity flags on
verifyreplace the policy a forge project's name implies instead of narrowing it. So--issueralone accepts a bundle signed in any repository. - The npm package matches
projectas a string and does not bind a GitHub or GitLab project to its repository. A verifier file copied from those release tags behaves the same way.
Update packslip, the npm package, or the copied verifier to get the
repository binding.
Check what install supports lists how
packslip install differs in those releases.
Other version differences:
- A forge pin that the 1.4 Rust crate stored with an owner ID still deserializes; later versions ignore the owner ID.
- The
jdx/packslip@v0action tag stopped advancing at 0.3.1. A workflow on@v0keeps working but gets no updates until it moves to@v1.
The mise packslip: backend (Use packslip with mise)
first shipped in mise 2026.9.2. Later releases added:
2026.9.4: man pages from a release's
manresource. A tool that an older mise installed needs one reinstall to get them:mise install --force packslip:github.com/jdx/hk2026.9.10: installing an exact or locked version without waiting for
minimum_release_age.2026.9.16: recording the forge's repository ID with a pin.
Verification matrix
Each release's tests run packslip 1.4.0 and the current verifier on the same inputs, and both must give these results:
- The real hk v2.3.0 release (Sigstore bundle v0.3, keyless Fulcio
certificate, Rekor
dsse0.0.1 entry, explicit release-workflow identity and issuer) verifies at its authenticated historical log time. - A newly generated release bundle and release list (Sigstore bundle v0.3, unlogged Ed25519 signatures, separately supplied public key) verify, even with unknown optional fields and extensions.
- A new release with an unknown resource kind verifies; the resource stays outside the consumer's known behavior.
- A modified artifact fails the artifact check.
- A signed
release/v2statement is rejected as an unsupported predicate version.
The checked support claim covers only Sigstore bundle v0.3 and Rekor
dsse/0.0.1 entries.
Trust-root lifetime and freshness
packslip installstarts from the TUF root built into the binary, refreshes the trust root from Sigstore's TUF repository, and caches the authenticated metadata;--offlineuses only that cache.--trusted-rootreplaces the refresh with an administrator-suppliedtrusted_root.json.packslip verifyandpackslip pin, in every build, use thetrusted_root.jsonbuilt into the binary and never refresh it. Once Sigstore signs with a certificate authority or log key that root lacks, new signatures fail until you update packslip. An administrator can instead pass a currenttrusted_root.json, authenticated through Sigstore's TUF repository, with--trusted-root.
The trust-root tests refresh from a signed synthetic TUF repository with distinct keys and root versions 1, 2, and 3:
- With root 1 expired in 2020, first online use in 2026 authenticates two successive rotations before accepting the current target.
- Offline reuse in 2036 makes no fetches and succeeds only while the cached authenticated metadata is unexpired.
- A later packaged root 3 accepts the history a root-1 consumer cached, online and offline.
- After a network failure, a fresh authenticated cache can be reused.
- Expired timestamp metadata, rollback, target corruption, and invalid online signatures fail.
These tests establish rotation and failure behavior but do not replay the
production Sigstore TUF repository's historical root chain. An old
binary's install can catch up only while that repository keeps every
intermediate root each transition needs.
Installing also needs an eligible release and current trust and list metadata. Age alone does not make a release ineligible: an installer test accepts a release published in 2020 when its list is fresh. Compatibility never makes packslip accept an expired list, a list sequence lower than one already accepted, or a release a security fix rejects; see Freshness and rollback protection.
Maintaining packaged verifiers
These can require a packslip update:
- a Sigstore certificate authority or log key newer than the built-in
trust root, for
verify,pin, andverify-clibuilds, which never refresh it (Trust-root lifetime and freshness) - a security fix
- a new Sigstore bundle or log format
- historical keys or certificates that are no longer available
- a changed signing algorithm
Upstream promises no fixed update cadence, maintenance horizon, or number of years an unchanged binary will work. It keeps verification and security fixes suitable for backporting to packaged verifiers. When a release breaks compatibility, its release notes name the affected versions, the format or test input, the reason, and the update or publisher change you need. A security rejection takes precedence over keeping a compatibility test passing.
Distributions decide which packaged packslip versions they maintain, with the verification matrix as evidence.
Check a tool's handoff
Every release must pass tests of how packslip install lays out and hands
off a tool:
- A tree with a command and adjacent runtime data installs, only that command is exported, and arguments and exit status pass through.
- Reinstalling to new tree and command directories keeps trust state.
- Discovery, extraction, host checks, ownership and recovery, key rotation, administrator constraints, list rollback, withdrawal, and failed replacement are exercised.
- Signature, digest, version, and policy conflicts are refused, even with
--force. - On Windows, a real-console test checks a child process that handles Ctrl+C and Ctrl+Break.
These tests do not establish that a tool's own setup and self-update work with the layout. Only mise has been checked by hand, on Linux x64 with packslip 1.5.1:
- In user scope, packslip installed mise 2026.9.18, whose bundle's SHA-256
was
f059ba8b18d5e8c4fb3f5e068dd0df72e84f61c3514a2b7ef7776e3cb81eecb2. Bash activation andmise execworked through the exported command. Self-update to 2026.10.1 kept it working, and packslip then reinstalled the earlier mise without--force. - In system scope, mise installed and ran in a Debian 13 container.
- Bootstrap mise in Docker was checked with mise 2026.10.1.
Other platform and scope combinations are unverified for mise's lifecycle.
Before you document packslip install for a tool on a new platform or
scope:
- Record the tool's exact release and bundle digest, the platform, the scope, the packslip version, and the tree and command paths.
- In an isolated account, run the tool's normal command, setup, and self-update through the exported command.
- Check that runtime files beside the command survive and are found, that arguments and exit status pass through, and that setup uses the intended scope.
- Note whether self-update replaces the executable or its exported command. Record any shell or PATH changes the tool makes itself.
- After self-update, check that the exported command still works. Then reinstall through packslip and check that it handles the changed ownership, including conflicts and recovery.
A successful --version call establishes less than this check.